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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ms. Williams appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
She contends the district court erred in denying her motion because the officer who
detained her violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution by detaining her in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Williams included a statement of the facts and course of proceedings in her
opening brief. (App. Br., pp.1-3.) She incorporates that statement by reference herein.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Williams’ motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Williams’ Motion To Suppress
In her opening brief, Ms. Williams argued the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress because she was seized, at the latest, when Officer Cowell asked
one of the other officers on scene to request a drug dog, and, at that time, Officer
Cowell lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (App. Br., pp.6-8.) In its brief,
the State argues “[Ms.] Williams’ argument fails because . . . Officer Cowell’s request for
a drug dog did not convert [Ms.] Williams’ voluntary presence into a seizure.” (Resp.
Br., p.9.) The State’s argument is directly contradicted by Officer Cowell’s testimony
and the district court’s factual findings.
The district court stated in its memorandum decision and order denying
Ms. Williams’ motion to suppress that Officer Cowell asked Deputy Murray to contact a
U.S. Border Patrol Agent with a drug detection dog to respond to the scene and “Cowell
testified that up until that point, [the driver] and Williams were free to leave.” (R., p.115
(emphasis added).)

This language suggests that after that point, the driver and

Ms. Williams were not free to leave. The district court also stated in its memorandum
decision that after requesting a drug dog, Officer Cowell advised Ms. Williams of her
Miranda rights and “directed her to sit down and stop talking.” (R., p.115.) She was
surely seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at that point, as a
reasonable person in her position would not have felt free to leave.

See State v.

Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (stating that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an
individual is seized if a reasonable person in her position would not have believed she
was free to leave); see also State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486 (2009) (“A seizure
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initiated through a show of authority requires words or actions, or both, by a law
enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was
ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.”).
As Ms. Williams argued in her opening brief, Officer Cowell did not have
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he asked Deputy Murray to request
a drug dog.

(App. Br., pp.6-8.) In its brief, the State does not even attempt to argue

Officer Cowell had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at this time, but instead
includes only a footnote stating it adopts on appeal the district court’s analysis of this
issue. (Resp. Br., p.12, n.3.) Ms. Williams discussed the district court’s analysis at
length in her opening brief. (App. Br., pp.6-8.) As she argued therein, none of the
factors discussed by the district court, viewed alone, or taken together, supported a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time Officer Cowell requested a drug dog
and advised Ms. Williams of her Miranda rights.
The State also contends Ms. Williams’ argument on appeal is not the same as
the argument she made in the district court, and should thus not be considered. (Resp.
Br., pp.9-10.) The State is incorrect. Ms. Williams argued in the district court that “the
evidence must be suppressed because the officer unlawfully detained Defendant
without a warrant and without reasonable suspicion to detain her, and/or the officer
unlawfully extended the detention of Defendant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and Article I § 17 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho.”

(R., p.69.)

In her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress,

Ms. Williams argued the initial encounter was not consensual and, even if it was,
Ms. Williams was later seized because, among other things, “Sgt. Cowell read

4

Ms. Williams her Miranda rights.”

(R., p.89.)

Ms. Williams cited case law for the

proposition that “[a] motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated if officers lengthen
a stop for a traffic violation by using a drug dog to examine the vehicle or by questioning
the occupants about drugs in the absence of reasonable suspicion of drug activity.”
(R., pp.91-92.) At the suppression hearing, counsel for Ms. Williams argued, “They ask
for a Border Patrol agent with a dog. He admits that episode 48 minutes in this contact .
. . . He didn’t have any reason—he didn’t have any probable cause to think that there
[were] drugs in the van. That’s why he was holding them for a drug dog so they could
get—make some probable cause.” (10/8/15 Tr., p.40, L.23 – p.41, L.5.)
The only difference between the argument made by Ms. Williams in the district
court and on appeal is that Ms. Williams now focuses solely on the time when Officer
Cowell requested a drug dog and read Ms. Williams her Miranda rights. The fact that
Ms. Williams has limited her argument on appeal surely does not mean this Court
cannot consider it.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2017.
_______/S/__________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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